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They cannot live without a shell and must locate
another empty shell when they outgrow the old one."4
I. INTRODUCTION
Just as the hermit crab cannot live without the protection of a
shell, the land developer in Florida exists only within the protective
shell of the corporate form. When a land developer has outgrown
one shell - i.e., when the developer has completed a project or a
phase of a project and is ready to move on to the next project or
phase - the developer finds a new protective shell to occupy. The
scurrying of developers from one protective corporate shell to
another creates a version of a shell game with environmental
agencies as the unsuspecting marks. "Pick the shell hiding the
developer and win an environmental enforcement case." Similar to
the gun lobby's favorite shibboleth "Guns don't kill people, people
kill people," frustrated environmental permit enforcers in Florida
may be tempted to adopt the slogan "Corporations don't pollute, the
people behind the corporations pollute."
Current laws in Florida afford substantial protection to the
"people behind the corporations" (corporate principals)5 and
generally do not allow environmental permitting agencies such as
the water management districts to consider such people in their
permitting or enforcement efforts. This article poses the question
"Do existing corporate law principles of limited liability defeat the
important public policy of water resource protection in Florida?"
First, in Parts II and III, this article introduces the problem and
provides an overview of Florida water management district
permitting and enforcement authorities and processes. Next, in
Part IV, this article explores the existing legal authorities for water
management districts to take into consideration past acts of
corporations and corporate principals in permitting and enforcement
actions. Part V provides a review of corporate legal protection,
describes the various types of business entities that may be permit
applicants, and provides an overview of legal mechanisms that can
defeat limited liability. Part VI reviews a variety of existing laws,
both state and federal, that authorize a permitting agency to peak
behind the corporate form. Finally, Part VII of this article presents
a number of considerations for change to address the problem.
4. COMPLETE FIELD GUIDE TO NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE (1981).
5. As shorthand, this article will use the term "corporate principals" to refer to the
directors, shareholders, and officers of a corporation or other business entity.
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II. THE PROBLEM
Under current law, the water management districts must accept
a permit applicant at face value -- that is the name of the applicant
on the application form is considered the applicant for the permit
and information supplied in the name of that applicant is used in
the permitting process. Whether the applicant applying for the
permit is an established corporation with roots in the local
community, or whether it is a limited liability company created by
a developer last Tuesday, the two are treated equally under the
permitting rules. It is this equal treatment that threatens to
eviscerate a substantial part of the environmental protections
afforded by a water management district's permitting program.
The permitting programs of the water management districts in
Florida are premised on the statutory requirement that a permit
applicant will receive a permit once that applicant has provided
reasonable assurances that the applicant will comply with the
agency's rules. These reasonable assurances form the basis for the
permitting criteria for the agencies. Once the applicant has met the
stated criteria, the permit for the requested activity is issued. As a
deterrent to applicants that have violated conditions of earlier
permits the water management districts must take into
consideration an applicant's history of noncompliance when
determining if the applicant has provided sufficient assurances to
meet the agency's permitting criteria. Also, when calculating civil
penalties against an entity that has violated the agency's rules or
permit, the agency can use past violations as a factor to increase the
recommended penalty against that entity. Business entities,
though, are designed to limit the liability of people participating in
business ventures and to encourage people to pool their money and
resources for those ventures. The business entity is the outer form
while the people provide the inner substance. Because the law
treats this outer form with deference and ignores the actual people
inside the entity, the water management districts are made
unwilling participants in the perpetuation of a fiction. After all, the
corporate form is a legal fiction. It exists only on paper; a "thing"
created and controlled by statute. The corporate form has no
existence outside the law. One cannot physically grasp a
corporation. One can touch property owned by a corporation, one
can point to a person who controls the corporation, one can receive
a check from a corporate bank account, but one can never declare
"ecce corpus!"' The people who run the businesses though are all too
6. Latin doggerel meaning roughly "behold the body."
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real. Also real are the wetlands that are filled, the habitat that is
lost, the floodwater on roads and in homes, and the water quality
degradation that can occur when water management regulations are
violated.
As an example of this problem, consider the following fact
pattern:
A developer who is an officer, director, and majority
shareholder of a closely held Florida corporation
obtains a permit in the name of his company from a
water management district to construct a residential
subdivision. During the construction of the project
the developer violates the conditions of the permit or
fails to follow the agency's rules. In response to the
violation the water management district initiates an
enforcement action against the developer's company
that results in a final order or judgment. Contained
within that final judgment or final order will be a
finding of fact that the developer's company violated
the permit or other agency rule. That company now
has a history of noncompliance with the agency.
There exists a written record of that company's
failure to abide by the rules. The developer now
wants to construct a new project, this time a
commercial development. Knowing that the first
company has a history of violations, and knowing
that the past violations must be considered by the
water management district during the permitting
process in determining whether reasonable
assurances have been provided that the project meets
permitting criteria, the developer simply creates a
new entity to be the permit applicant.7 The developer
can form an entirely new corporation, the developer
can form a limited liability company with his original
corporation as the manager, or he can form a limited
7. In the world of land development in Florida, it is not uncommon for a multi-phase
residential or commercial development to have a new "developer" for each phase of the project.
For instance, Phase One of a residential project may be called "Secret Oaks Manor" and may
be developed by the "Secret Oaks Manor Development Corporation." Phase II, called "Secret
Oaks Estates" is developed by "Secret Oaks Estates Developers, Inc." while Phase III, "Secret
Oaks Forest" is developed by the Secret Oaks Forest Development Company. And so it goes
for as many phases of the Secret Oaks as are developed. What may or may not be so "secret,"
however, is that each separate business entirety developer shares the same principals - i.e.,
regardless of the name, corporate registration and business structure, the "developers" behind
each Secret Oaks phase are one in the same.
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liability partnership with a figurehead general
partner and his company as the limited partner. This
new business entity will not have a past that can be
used against it and, even though it's the same person
controlling the applicant entity, the water
management district must look solely at the new
entity and ignore the individual developer. From the
standpoint of the application, the developer has
disappeared, submerged within his new business
entity. It is the ease with which new business
entities can be created and the apparent blind eye
that water management district permitting rules
turn to that threatens to frustrate the substantial
environmental laws of the permitting programs.'
8. Although not a water management district case, the problem of the tension between
corporate protection and environmental protection is illustrated by the much publicized case
involving the Suwannee American Cement Company's application for an air construction
permit to build a cement plant near Branford, Florida. In June 1999, the Florida Department
of Environmental Protection (DEP) denied the air construction permit sought by Suwannee
American Cement Company, Inc. DEP web site, available at
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/offiese/news/cement.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2001). To deny the
permit, DEP relied on a little-used rule that allows the agency to consider an applicant's
previous violations when determining whether the applicant will comply with the new permit.
Telephone interview with Jack Chisholm, DEP attorney (March 14,2001). This rule provides
that the Department shall take into consideration a permit applicant's violation of any
Department rules at any installation when determining whether the applicant has provided
reasonable assurances that Department standards will be met. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R.
62.4.070(5) (2000). Because Suwannee American was a newly formed corporation, the
company had never held an DEP permit and therefore had no violations. Id. However, the
company was linked to other permittees with a history of permit violations. Thus, in denying
the permit, DEP cited the "compliance history of the applicant's related businesses" at
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/offiesec/news/cement.htm. Although the exact relationship is
unclear, Suwannee American is affiliated with Anderson Columbia, Inc., a corporation that
owned the mine where the cement plant would be located and that is one of the largest road-
paving firms in the state. Joe Anderson, II founded Anderson Columbia, and his two sons are
the primary shareholders of five other companies. Taken together, the companies have
obtained more than 80 state permits and have been cited for 15 violations in a 14-year period.
Enforcement Turnaround, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug. 30,1999. Suwannee American challenged
the permit denial, alleging that DEP's decision was arbitrary because the agency had issued
permits to companies with worse environmental records. Eventually Suwannee American and
DEP settled the case, and DEP issued the permit one year after the initial denial available
at http'//www.dep.state.fl.us/offiesec/news/cement.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2001). The
Suwannee American case is instructive in highlighting the lack of a link between violations
and future permits, and the difficulty in evaluating a new company's ability to comply with
a permit. Because the case settled, however, DEP's reliance on FLA. ADMIN. CODE R.
62.4.070(5) (2000), and its expansive definition of "applicant" remains untested.
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III. OVERVIEW OF WMD PERMITTING AND ENFORCEMENT
A. Background
In 1972, the Florida legislature enacted chapter 373 of the
Florida Statutes, entitled the Florida Water Resources Protection
Act. This Act, based in large part on the Model Water Code,9 was
intended to implement the policy of Article II, section 7, of the
Florida Constitution, by preserving natural resources, fish and
wildlife, minimizing degradation of water resources caused by
stormwater discharges, and providing for the management of water
and related land resources.'0  Under chapter 373, water
management districts are responsible for addressing issues such as
water supply, flood protection, water quality, and protection of
natural systems. These responsibilities are carried out through the
implementation of a number of regulatory and nonregulatory
programs. One of the most far-sighted acts of the crafters of the
Water Resources Act of 1972 was to recognize that water resources
do not stop at city or county boundaries and to establish the State's
five water management districts based on watershed boundaries
rather than political boundaries. This regional/watershed-based
aspect of water management is critical to the protection of water
resources. Chapter 373 contains two primary regulatory tools for
protecting water resources the Environmental Resource Permitting
(ERP) program of Part IV and the Consumptive Use of Water
Permitting (CUP) tool of Part II. The issues addressed in this
article arise primarily in the context of ERP permitting and
enforcement.
B. Environmental Resource Permitting
Virtually all land development above a certain size in Florida is
regulated under the Environmental Resource Permitting ("ERP")
program of Part IV, chapter 373, Florida Statutes. This program is
extremely broad in its scope, which is not surprising given its roots
in the Model Water Code, which intended to capture "virtually every
type of artificial or natural structure or construction that can be
used to connect to, draw water from, drain water into, or be placed
across surface water ... [including] ... all structures and
constructions that can have an effect on surface waters.""
9. MALONEY, AUSNESS & MORRIS, A MODEL WATER CODE (1972).
10. FLA. STAT. § 373.016 (2000); Prugh v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 578 So. 2d
1130, 1131 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
11. MALONEY, AusNEss & MORRIS, A MODEL WATER CODE 223 (1972).
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Specifically, the jurisdiction of the ERP program includes the
construction, alteration, operation, maintenance, abandonment, and
removal of any "stormwater management system," "dam,"
"impoundment," "reservoir," "appurtenant works," "works," and all
"dredging and filling" in surface waters or wetlands. Individually
and collectively, these terms are referred to as "surface water
management systems" or "systems".12  Thus, the ERP program
covers most land development systems, including buildings, parking
lots, roads, ditches, pits and mines, whether in uplands, wetlands
or other surface waters.'3
The statutory authority for the Districts' ERP permitting
program is derived from sections 373.413 and 373.416, Florida
Statutes.14  These sections authorize the water management
districts to, among other things, "require such permits and impose
such reasonable conditions as are necessary to assure" that the
construction, alteration, operation or maintenance of a system will
comply with the provisions of Part IV of chapter 373 and will not be
harmful to the water resources of the district. Thus, the focus of the
ERP program is a public health, welfare and safety purpose, to-wit
protection of the water resources. The ERP program is often
described as regulating water quality and water quantity and
protecting natural water or wetland systems. The specific
permitting criteria that address each of these areas of protection are
found in each district's regulations. For the St. Johns River Water
Management District," the permitting criteria are found in sections
40C-4.301 and 4C-4.302 of the Florida Administrative Code. Section
40C-4.301 of the Code applies to all construction, alteration,
operation, maintenance, removal or abandonment of surface waters
management systems whether in uplands, wetlands or other surface
12. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 40C-4.021(26) (2000).
13. A number ofexemptions from ERP requirements for specific activities are found in both
the statutes and regulations. FLA. STAT. §§ 373.406,403.813 (2000); FLA. ADMIN. CODER. 40C-
4.051 (2000). One of the most significant exemptions is the exemption for the alteration of the
topography of the land by agricultural, silvicultural, and horticultural activities.
14. Chapter 373, Florida Statutes authorizes the water management districts to require
permits to protect the water resources of the District. Section 373.413 addresses the
construction and alteration of systems. Section 373.416 addresses the maintenance and
operation of systems. Section 373.426 addressees the abandonment and removal of systems.
FLA. STAT. §§ 373.413, .416, .426 (2000).
15. Each water management district, except for the Northwest Florida Water Management
District, has its own ERP regulations. All of these regulations, however, share many
similarities. For the purposes of this article, the St. Johns River Water Management
District's regulations, found at FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 40C-4, will be used for illustrative
purposes. The South Florida Water Management District's regulations are found at FLA.
ADMIN. CODE R. 40E-4, the Southwest Florida Water Management District's rules are found
at FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 40D-4, and the Suwannee River Water Management District's rules
are found at FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 40B-4.
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waters. The application of section 4.302 of the Code is limited to
activities that occur in, on, or over wetlands or other surface
waters. 16
Among other things, the criteria in 40C-4.301 of the Florida
Administrative Code expressly prohibits any activity that would
cause adverse water quantity impacts, cause or contribute to a
violation of a state water quality standard, or cause adverse impacts
to the functions provided to fish and wildlife by wetlands and other
surface water. Parroting the language of subsection 373.414(a),
Florida Statutes, section 40C-4.302 of the Florida Administrative
Code contains the public interest balancing test from the old
Wetland Resource Management program, which requires
consideration of seven different factors relating to water resource
protection. The water quantity and water quality criteria in these
rules often can be met through engineering design solutions,
17
whereas the criteria related to protecting wetland functions often
are met through either avoiding wetland impacts or providing
mitigation to offset impacts to wetlands.'"
C. Enforcement Authorities
1. Legal Authorities
Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, provides a number of authorities
for water management districts to bring administrative, civil and
criminal enforcement actions against violators of water
management district statutes, rules, permits, and orders. Parts I
and VI of chapter 373 contain general enforcement authorities that
apply to all water management district regulatory programs,
whereas authorities specific to environmental resource permitting
are found in Part IV. The authority for administrative enforcement
is found in section 373.119, Florida Statutes, which provides that
16. The two different sets of permitting criteria reflect the origins of the ERP program.
Prior to the effective date of the ERP program, October 1995, two separate but overlapping
regulatory programs governed land development in Florida the Management and Storage of
Surface Waters ("MSSW") program in Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and the Wetland
Resource Management Program ("WRM", often referred to as "dredge and fill") from Chapter
403. The old MSSW program addressed land activities whether in uplands or wetlands,
whereas the scope of the WRM program was limited to activities in wetlands. When the two
programs were merged, as part of a legislatively-mandated streamlining effort, to form the
ERP program, the bulk of both sets of criteria were retained.
17. District rules contain a number of "presumptive design" criteria, which if met provide
a presumption that the applicable criteria will be met. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 40C-42.026
(2000).
18. Subsection 373.414(b), Florida Statutes, expressly provides that if an applicant is
unable to otherwise meet the criteria of section 373.414, it may propose mitigation to offset
the impacts from the regulated activity. FLA. STAT. § 373.414(b) (2000).
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whenever a District's Executive Director has reason to believe that
a violation of any provision of chapter 373, District rules, District
orders, or permits, has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur,
the Executive Director may cause a written complaint to be served
upon the alleged violator or violators. The administrative complaint
will contain a proposed order that will become final unless the
person named in the complaint requests an administrative hearing
within 14 days after the complaint is served. Notably, this section
does not authorize the water management districts to impose
administrative penalties. To obtain penalties, the Districts must
seek them in court under the Districts' civil enforcement authority
in section 373.129, Florida Statutes. This section provides that the
water management district Governing Board is authorized to
commence and maintain proper and necessary actions in any court
of competent jurisdiction for the following purposes to enforce rules,
regulations, and orders; to enjoin or abate violations of provisions of
law or District rules, regulations and order; to protect and preserve
the water resources of the State; to recover a civil penalty not to
exceed $10,000 per violation; and to recover investigative costs,
court costs, and reasonable attorney's fees.
The Districts' criminal enforcement authority is found in section
373.613, Florida Statutes, which provides that any person who
violates any provision of this law or any rule, regulation or order
adopted or issued pursuant thereto is guilty of a misdemeanor of the
second degree. Additional enforcement authorities specific to ERP
violations are found in section 373.430, which provides that certain
violations of the ERP rules constitute criminal misdemeanors or
felonies.' 9 Significantly, none of these enforcement authorities
expressly limit against whom the districts may bring an action.
Section 373.119 refers to "the alleged violator," section 373.129
merely refers to bringing an action to "enforce" rules or to enjoin or
abate violations without reference to whom the actions can be
brought against and sections 373.430 and 373.614 refer to "any
person who violates" applicable laws. The term "person" is defined
broadly to include individuals, firms, associations, organizations,
partnerships, business trusts, corporations, companies, and
governmental entities.2"
19. Part IV of Chapter 378 also authorizes the water management districts to revoke or
modify a permit under certain specified circumstances. Under section 373.429 a water
management district governing board or the DEP may revoke an ERP if the permitted
stormwater management system or other permitted works becomes a danger to public health
or safety, or if its operation is inconsistent with the objectives of the agency. FLA. STAT. §
373.429 (2000).
20. FLA. STAT. § 373.019(12) (2000).
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2. Enforcement Processes and Options
The water management districts issue hundreds of permits each
month. Unfortunately, there will always exist those persons who
either cannot or will not comply with Florida law or the agency's
rules and permits. These violations tend to fall into one of two
categoriesfailure to comply with a condition of a permit issued by
the water management district, or undertaking an activity not
authorized by either a permit or the rules.
Resolution of a violation begins with the discovery of the
violation, usually by either a staff member of a water management
district or through a citizen's complaint. Once an agency staff
member has inspected the property and determined that a violation
does exist, the agency will mail a notice of violation to the
responsible party. If the violation stems from noncompliance with
an issued permit, the responsible party is the permittee. If no
permit has been issued (or is under review by the agency), the notice
of violation is sent to the owner of the property. The notice of
violation will describe the violation observed, explain why that
observed activity violates Florida law or the agency rules, and may
set forth a corrective plan of action to resolve the matter. If,
because of the nature of the violation, no corrective action plan can
be formulated, the agency will request that the responsible party
meet with the staff to develop the necessary corrective actions.
Generally, the necessary corrective actions will require the
responsible party to either obtain a permit from the water
management district to authorize the earlier activity or restore the
property to its pre-violation condition.
The water management districts have a number of options to
resolve violations of their rules. The agency may seek to resolve the
violation through an informal process, a consent order, an
administrative complaint, or an action in court. The actual means
chosen to enforce the rules is left to the discretion of the agency.
Deciding which process to use is based on the severity of the
violation and the willingness or cooperation of the responsible party
to participate in the process.
The most common means to resolve a violation is through an
informal resolution process. An informal process is used only for
minor violations that are easily corrected and do not involve actual
harm to the water resource. Such minor violations may include
"paperwork" violations such as the failure to timely submit required
monitoring reports or other documentation. After the notice of
violation has been sent, and the responsible party agrees to
implement the necessary corrective actions, agency staff will work
with the responsible party to correct the violation. Given the
[Vol. 17:1
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cooperation of the responsible party and minimal impact or threat
caused by the violation, no formal enforcement action will be
initiated and no civil penalty will be requested. Once the
responsible party completes the necessary corrective actions in
accordance with the agency's directions the violation is considered
resolved and the entire matter concluded.
If, due to the severity of the violation, the agency determines
that the informal resolution process is not appropriate for the
violation, but the responsible party still wishes to resolve the
violation amicably, the agency and the responsible party, also
known as the respondent, may enter into a consent order. A consent
order is a negotiated written agreement between the agency and the
respondent setting forth the facts of the unauthorized activity or
violation, conclusions of law stating why such activity is a violation
of Florida law or agency rules, and containing the corrective actions
necessary to bring the matter into compliance. Under the terms of
the consent order, the responsible party admits to the violations and
acknowledges its failure to comply with the agency rules. Unlike
the informal resolution process that required the responsible party
only to correct the violation, the agency generally will require the
respondent to pay a civil penalty as one of the terms of the consent
order in addition to performing the corrective actions. The means
of determining the amount of the civil penalty will be explained
below, but its purpose is to reflect the severity of the violation and
to serve as a deterrent effect to encourage both the respondent and
the public to comply with the agency's rules. An additional
monetary amount will be added to the civil penalty by the agency to
cover the agency's staff investigative costs and attorney's fees for
investigating and settling the violation.
Once the consent order has been executed, and the respondent
has paid the civil penalty and completed the corrective plan of
action, no further enforcement action is taken against that
respondent for that violation. From the agency's perspective the
matter is considered finished. For a responsible party, however, a
consent order often becomes the first record of its history of
noncompliance with the agency. The agency now has a written
record of that respondent's violations. The consent order is also
available to the public under the Public Records law2' and so the
facts of the violation are easily obtained.
When the responsible party will not admit to the violation, or
the agency and the responsible party are unable to reach an
agreement to resolve the violation, the agency has the authority to
21. Id. ch. 119.
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initiate an enforcement action against the responsible party through
an administrative complaint.22
The administrative complaint will contain a statement of facts
detailing the violation or unauthorized activity, a statement of law
or rules applicable to the administrative complaint, and a proposed
order listing the necessary corrective actions.2" After being served
with the administrative complaint, the respondent has fourteen
days to request an administrative hearing if he wishes to challenge
the agency's allegations in the administrative complaint.24 If the
respondent fails to file a request for administrative hearing within
the required timeframe, the corrective actions as stated in the
proposed order become final.25 That means the proposed order
becomes a final order of the agency.
If the respondent does file a request for an administrative
hearing, the hearing is conducted in accordance with the
Administrative Procedures Act of chapter 120, Florida Statutes.26
Following the conclusion of the hearing, the administrative law
judge will submit a recommended order to the agency that then
issues the final order.27 The agency's final order will contain a
statement of facts, conclusions of law, and an order setting forth the
actions that must be followed to correct the violation.28
One of the defining features of an administrative complaint is
that the agency cannot obtain civil penalties through the
administrative process, and, unless it recovers its investigative costs
and attorney's fees 29 following an administrative hearing, the
agency will recover no penalty or fine for the violation. Pursuant to
section 120.69, Florida Statutes, however, the agency may file a
petition to enforce the administrative complaint final order in
circuit court. The agency may request that the circuit court assess
penalties and require the payment of investigative costs and
attorney's fees.
The administrative complaint, like the consent order, serves the
purpose of documenting a respondent's history of noncompliance.
The administrative complaint is another record of a party or entity's
failure to comply with the agency rules
Water management districts also have the option of bypassing
the administrative process and seeking relief in a court of competent
22. Id. § 373.119(1).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 120.569; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 28-106 (2000).
27. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.569(1), 57(k)-() (2000); FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 28-106.216(1) (2000).
28. Id.
29. As allowed under FLA. STAT. § 120.595 (2000).
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jurisdiction, either county or circuit.3 ° The actual relief sought by
the water management districts would depend on the type of
violation and the remedy appropriate to resolve the matters at
issue. The agencies may request injunctive relief, either an
injunction preventing the defendant from carrying out certain
activities (e.g., an injunction to stop the unauthorized filling of
wetlands), or a mandatory injunction instructing the defendant to
take certain actions to remedy the problem (e.g., an injunction
requiring unauthorized fill to be removed from wetlands).3' The
agencies may also request a civil penalty be assessed against the
defendant for the violations.32 Water management districts are also
authorized to recover investigative costs, court costs, and reasonable
attorney's fees for the enforcement action.33
The filing of an enforcement action in court follows the normal
pattern of a regular lawsuit and is bound by all the procedural
requirements of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The agency
will first file a complaint in the appropriate county, usually where
the violation occurred, the defendant will answer, discovery will
ensue, and, when both parties are ready, the matter is set for trial.
The agency must then prove its casethat the defendant violated
Florida law or the agency's rules. Then a water management
district must request the judgment against the defendant include a
civil penalty.
Water management districts are also authorized to seek
enforcement of their final agency actions, such as Consent Orders
and Final Orders resulting from the filing of an administrative
complaint, in circuit court.34 This procedure is necessary because
the agencies do not have authority on their own to enforce the final
orders. If a respondent fails to comply with the final order of
administrative complaint or consent order, the water management
districts must resort to circuit court to enforce the terms of the final
agency action. If forced to file an action under this statute, the
agency may request, in addition to an order to comply with the final
agency action, civil penalties for the failure to comply with that
agency's order.3"
The amount of the penalty is almost solely within the
discretionary authority of the presidingjudge. The only restriction
on the amount is the statutory limit of $10,000 per day for each
30. Id. § 373.129, 136.
31. Id. § 373.129(2), 136(1).
32. Id. § 373.129(5).
33. Id. § 373.129(6).
34. Id. § 120.69(1)(a).
35. Id. § 120.69(2).
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violation.36 The agency bears the burden of presenting sufficient
evidence of the severity of the violation and the actual harm or
threat of harm to the natural resource to establish a recommended
civil penalty. The recommended penalty is calculated by the agency
in accordance with the procedures set forth in the penalty matrix.
The water management districts use a penalty matrix to
determine the appropriate amount of the penalty for the violation.37
The penalty matrix is part of the guidelines developed by the
Department of Environmental Protection and the water
management districts to resolve violations of their respective rules
and permits. The penalty matrix considers two factorsthe potential
for environmental harm and extent of deviation from a statutory or
regulatory requirement. These two factors form the axes of the
actual matrix. Each axis is then divided into three categories or
levelsmajor, moderate, and minor. Each violation is assigned a level
from each axis that corresponds to that violation's potential for
environmental harm and deviation from the rules. As an example,
a violation that is determined to represent a significant threat to
human health but only deviates somewhat from the requirements
of the law, would be classified as Moderate on the potential for
environmental harm axis and as Minor on the deviation from
regulatory requirement axis.
The matrix may be pictured as a square containing nine possible
categories into which a violation will be placed depending on its
factual elements. Each of these nine categories contains a
recommended penalty range that is further refined by applying
other factors surrounding the violation. Once the agency
establishes a penalty based on the penalty matrix, the agency may
adjust the penalty up or down based on a number of considerations.
The agencies may take into account factors favorable to the violator
such as a good faith effort to comply, a willingness to cooperate and
inability to pay. On the other side of the equation, the agencies may
consider such factors as the violator's refusal to stop an ongoing
violation, a failure to cooperate, and the economic benefit the
violator gained by its violation of the environmental laws. Using
those factors, the recommended penalty is adjusted either up or
36. Id. § 373.129(5).
37. The penalty matrix used by the water management districts is found within the
"Guidelines for Characterizing Water Management Violations," dated Oct. 10, 1990. The
Florida Department of Environmental Protection follows the revised penalty matrix contained
within its SETTLEMENT GUIDLINES FOR CIVIL PENALTIES, DEP Directive 923, EffectiveAugust
12, 1997. Because the Florida Department of Environmental Protection cannot itself impose
penalties on violators, the Settlement Guidelines are not adopted by rule. The penalty matrix
remains as guideline and nothing more. See, Envirochem Envtl. Serv. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
16 F.A.L.R. 1467 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs. 1994).
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down to arrive at a final number. It is this number that is
presented to a responsible party for settlement purposes during the
negotiation of a consent order, or, is presented to a judge during the
penalty determination phase of enforcement litigation.
IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR CONSIDERATION OF COMPLIANCE
HISTORY (PAST VIOLATIONS) IN PERMITTING AND ENFORCEMENT
A person's or entity's history of non-compliance with water
management district rules plays a role in both the permitting and
enforcement process. Past violations and a failure to comply with
the agency's rules are required to be taken into account when the
agency reviews a new environmental resource permit (ERP)
application from that party. The agency must also take past
violations into account when determining a recommended penalty
for any new violations for which that party is responsible. The three
major water management districts, St. Johns River Water
Management District, Southwest Florida Water Management
District, and the South Florida Water Management District are
required by law to consider a permit applicant's past history of
violations when determining whether that permit applicant has
provided reasonable assurances that the agency's permitting
standards will be met. All three of these water management
districts have a rule stating:
When determining whether the applicant has
provided reasonable assurances that the District
permitting standards will be met, the District shall
take into consideration a permit applicant's violation
of any Department [of Environmental Protection]
rules adopted pursuant to Sections 403.91-.929, F.S.
(1984 Supp.), as amended, which the District had the
responsibility to enforce pursuant to a delegation, or
any District rules adopted pursuant to part IV,
chapter 373, F.S., relating to any other project or
activity and efforts taken by the applicant to resolve
those violations (emphasis added).38
The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has a
similar rule concerning an applicant's history and failure to comply
with the Department's rules under its standards for issuing or
denying permits. DEP "shall take into consideration a permit
applicant's violation of any Department rules at any installations
38. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 40C-4.301(2), 40D-4.301(2), 40E-4.302(2), (2000) (respectively).
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when determining whether the applicant has provided reasonable
assurances that Department standards will be met."3"
The term "applicant" is not defined in the water management
district rules. The policy of the water management districts is to
determine the identity of the applicant based on the name of the
person or entity signing the application form for an environmental
resource permit. If the signature on the application form is that of
an individual person, then that person is considered the applicant.
If the signature on the form is that of a person signing on behalf of
a company or business, then that business entity is considered the
applicant. The water management districts do not delve any further
into the identity of the applicant. The representations of the
identity of the applicant are taken at face value.
If the applicant for an ERP has violated the agency's rules in the
past, the water management districts may impose additional
conditions or requirements in the permit as a means of ensuring the
applicant will meet the agency's permitting standards. One means
of providing additional assurances that the permitting standards
will be met is by the furnishing of financial assurances in the form
of a bond by the applicant. The Suwannee Water Management
District, Southwest Florida Water Management District, and South
Florida Water Management District each have rules authorizing the
districts to require a permit applicant to post a bond, made payable
to that water management district, conditioned upon full compliance
with the terms of the permit, including proper construction,
operation, and maintenance of the facility.4" Each Governing Board
of those water management districts has the authority to determine
the amount of the bond.41 These rules do not specify under what
circumstances a bond should be required and do not explicitly
authorize the consideration of the applicant's compliance history in
making such a determination. While the St. Johns River Water
Management District does not have a specific binding rule, it has in
some cases required the posting of a bond as a means of providing
reasonable assurances from applicants with a history of violations.
The DEP has a similar rule that allows them to require an applicant
to submit proof of financial responsibility and may require the
applicant to post an appropriate bond to guarantee compliance with
the law and Department rules.42
In addition, the St. Johns River Water Management District, as
well as the other water management districts and the Florida
39. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 62-4.070(5) (2000).
40. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 40B-1.704, 40D-1.604, 40E-1.604, (2000) (respectively).
41. Id.
42. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 62-4.110 (2000).
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Department of Environmental Protection, does have a financial
assurance requirement for wetland mitigation projects that are
estimated to cost more than $25,000.00."' This requirement is to
ensure that sufficient funding is available to carry out construction,
management, monitoring and any corrective action necessary to
ensure the mitigation is successful. Financial assurance may be
provided through a number of specified mechanisms including,
among other things, a performance bond, irrevocable letter of credit,
trust fund agreement, or deposit of cash into an escrow account,"'
and must be in an amount equal to 110 percent of the cost of the
mitigation.45
If a bond has been furnished to provide additional reasonable
assurance, and the permit applicant fails to comply with the permit
conditions, then the water management district or DEP can draw on
the bond. The money from the bond will be used by the agency to
either complete or correct the facility so as to bring that system into
compliance with the permit.
The posting of a bond is a common requirement for contractors
and other entities that enter into contracts with the state or a local
municipality. The bond provides an assurance that the contractor
has sufficient financial capabilities to construct the project, and, if
the contractor fails to comply with the terms of the contract, the
state or municipality can draw on the bond to complete the project.
Florida law requires the posting of a bond prior to the construction
of public water and sewage systems," a public building,4 a public
school, 4'and construction of a county road.49 Florida law also
authorizes the state, counties, and municipalities to require
contractors to post a bond conditioned upon the contractors'
compliance with state and local building codes."0 So not only must
the contractor complete the job in accordance with the contract, but
the contractor must also follow all applicable building codes during
the construction of the project.
A history of noncompliance can also be used as a basis for
denying a permit application. While there are no reported cases
where a water management district used a permit applicant's
history of violations as grounds for denial, DEP has asserted Rule
43. Rule 12.3.7, APPLICANT'S HANDBOOK MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE OF SURFACE WATERS
(hereinafter A.H.), incorporated by reference in FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 40C-4.091 (2000).
44. Rule 12.3.7.6, A.H.
45. Rule 12.3.7.2, A.H.
46. FLA. STAT. § 153.10.
47. Id. § 255.05(1)(a).
48. Id. § 237.201.
49. Id. § 336.44(4).
50. Id. § 489.131(3)(e).
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62-4.070(5), Florida Administrative Code, as a consideration in the
permitting process. In two of these administrative cases, the permit
applicant's past violations of statutes and rules were considered by
the DEP in determining whether the applicant had provided
reasonable assurances that the standards in the permit application
would be met. In both cases, the AU made a finding of fact that the
past violations did not justify denial of the permit and recommended
that the DEP issue the permit.5
One case that resulted in a different conclusion was Department
ofEnvironmental Protection v. Mid-County Recycling Company,52 in
which the AJ recommended denial of the permit application to
operate a Materials Recovery Facility, in part due to the applicant's
previous permit violations on the same site. The applicant had
received an earlier permit to operate the facility and while
inspecting the permitted facility DEP discovered numerous permit
violations. The applicant had violated the terms of the earlier
permit by storing substantial quantities of waste outside the
premises of the facility, by failing to consistently separate and reject
unacceptable materials, and by failing to provide a suitable system
for collection and treatment of leachate and liquid wastes.5 The
DEP eventually filed an administrative complaint against the
permit applicant who then failed to comply with the corrective
actions to bring the permit into compliance. The applicant was also
uncooperative and did not follow through on its promises to repair
the problems. The AJ made a conclusion of law that"Mid-County's
willful and repeated violations of its Permit conditions must be
considered in determining whether Mid-County's Material Resource
Facility (MRF) application gives reasonable assurances that it will
meet all DEP standards."54 The AIJ then found that "giving proper
consideration to Mid-County's history of non-compliance with its
Permit, as well as the lack of any assurance that Mid-County has
the necessary expertise, Mid-County has not provided reasonable
assurances that the MRF application will meet all of these DEP
standards."5 Based on those findings, the AI recommended denial
51. In Patricia D'Hondt v. Constr. Burning, Inc., and Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 1996 WL
1060015 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs. 1996), the applicant's air curtain incinerator failed
inspections resulted in two consent orders with the Department, one of which included a
$2,000.00 fine. In Julie Hellmuth v. Carolina Solite Corp. and Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 1995 WL
1052772 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs. 1995), the past violations are not specified but the
Administrative Law Judge found that the "violations were not severe and [the applicant]
corrected the problems."
52. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Mid-County Recycling Co., 1997 WL 1052392 (Fla. Div. Admin.
Hrgs. 1997)
53. Id. at paragraphs 13-20.
54. Id. at paragraph 66.
55. Id. at paragraph 72.
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of the MRF application. The DEP accepted that recommendation
and denied the permit.
A party's failure to comply with an agency's rules is also taken
into consideration during the enforcement process. A history of that
party's noncompliance is a factor in the penalty matrix that is
included in the calculation to determine an appropriate settlement
penalty. In the "Guidelines for Characterizing Water Management
Violations" used by the water management districts, a history of
noncompliance will be used to boost the original penalty by an
additional 10 percent or more. There are no concrete guidelines
though as to what is considered a past violation, or if there is a
"statute of limitations" that may limit the use of past violations
given the length of time between the past and current violation.
The DEP also considers past violations when calculating the
recommended settlement penalty. DEP Directive 923 states:
This adjustment factor [history of noncompliance] can
only be used to increase the amount of penalties
derived from the penalty matrix. This adjustment
factor should be used if a violation occurred within a
four year period previous to the occurrence of the
current violation and at minimum a non-compliance
letter or Warning Letter was issued for the violation;
the previous violations involved any of the programs
regulated by the Department; and the previous
violations occurred at the same facility as the current
violation, or at another facility under the same
management.5 6
Both the "Guidelines for Characterizing Water Management
Violations," used by the water management districts, and
"Settlement Guidelines for Civil Penalties," used by the DEP, refer
to the violator as the "responsible party," a term that is not defined
by any of the agencies. As a practical matter, when a violation of a
permit has occurred, the issuing agency will seek to hold the
permittee as the responsible party. If the violation does not involve
an issued permit, the agency will seek to hold the person or entity
that performed the unauthorized activity responsible. As with the
consideration of who or what is the permit applicant, an agency will
not look beyond the surface of an applicant's name when assessing
blame.
56. DEP Directive 923, supra note 37, at 9.
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Because the agencies are not authorized to look behind the
faqade of the business entity, developers can easily avoid the
additional conditions and restrictions imposed on a permit for past
violations by simply creating a new business entity for each new
project. By starting fresh with a new company, a developer never
need fear that a water management district will deny a permit
application for his past activities while running a different company.
V. REVIEW OF CORPORATE LEGAL PROTECTIONS
A. Theory of Corporate Structure
Environmental laws and business organization laws were
enacted to accomplish very different purposes - - to protect the
public interest and the environment and to provide a mechanism for
pooling primarily financial resources while providing limited
liability to corporate principals." The fundamental tenet of
corporate law is that a corporation is a separate legal entity distinct
from its officers, directors, and shareholders. As such, the
corporation itself is liable for its obligations and torts, and its
officers, directors and shareholders generally are protected from
personal liability. Traditionally, corporate shareholders are only
investors in the corporation in which they own stock and are not
liable for acts and obligations of the corporation beyond the extent
of their investment. This is the premise for the doctrine of limited
liability. Limited liability insulates not only individual
shareholders, but also parent corporation shareholders. Under
certain circumstances, however, corporate principals may be liable
for the acts or obligations of the corporation. At least three legal
mechanisms exist to reach corporate principals who attempt to hide
57. The issue of the friction between corporate protection and environmental protections
recently has begun to emerge as an important topic in the environmental law discourse. For
example, in 1996, the University of Oregon's Public Interest Environmental Law Conference
held a symposium entitled Environment and Business Toward Sustainability or Ecological
Collapse. Perhaps one of the most provocative participants in the symposium was Richard
Grossman, whose paper Revoking the Corporation, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 141 (1996),
advocates a return to the use of quo warranto, the proceeding where the "people" examined
corporate acts when some harm had occurred and demanded to know by what authority has
this subordinate entity (the corporation) taken such an action. If the corporation was found
to have acted ultra vires, it was the people's right as sovereign to dissolve the corporation -
"not simply to chide it, or scold it, or fine it ... but to remove it." Id. While this remedy may
be appropriate for certain types of environmentar wrongs committed by corporate entities in
circumstances such as where a large established manufacturer commits an environmental
harm of such import that it is adjudged to no longer have the right to continue to transact
business, the remedy would not redress the problem explored in this article - i.e., where new
corporate entities are repeatedly created and then dissolved so as to avoid a "history" that can
be used against them.
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behind the shield of limited liability 1) the judicially created doctrine
of piercing of the corporate veil; 2) personal liability where a
corporate principal has personally participated in the corporate
wrongdoing in his or her individual capacity; and 3) where the
legislature has provided explicit authority to reach the corporate
principals. Each of these is addressed below.
B. Corporate Formation and Dissolution
Under Florida law, forming and dissolving a corporation is a
relatively simple matter. To create a corporation, a person simply
must submit articles of incorporation, basic information such as
agent's name, and fees to the Department of State.58 The
corporation exists when the articles are filed, unless the articles
specify a date within five days before the filing date, or a date after
the filing date.59 The Department of State now provides online
access, so a person may create a corporation in minutes by
responding to a few questions online and by providing a credit card
number for fees that can be as low as $70.60
If forming a corporation is easy, dissolving one is even a simpler
task. Corporations may dissolve in three ways.61  First, a
corporation may voluntarily dissolve upon action by its board of
directors and shareholders and upon filing articles of dissolution
with the Department of State.62  Nothing in the voluntary
dissolution procedure requires the corporation to account for its
outstanding obligations.63 After dissolution, the corporation does
not operate, but it continues to exist for the purpose of winding up
its affairs and liquidating its assets and liabilities.' The act of
58. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.0120-.0122 (2000). The Department of State charges a fee of $35 for
most document filings. FLA. STAT. § 607.0122 (2000).
59. FLA. STAT. § 607.0203 (2000). The provision that allows corporate existence to begin
before actual filing protects promoters from personal liability for transactions before the filing
date. Section 607.0123(3) also protects promoters by allowing documents to be filed to correct
deficiencies in the original incorporation documents, and the original filing date is maintained
as if the original documents had been valid, unless a party adversely relies on the original
documents. STUART R. COHN & STUART D. AMES, FLORIDA BUSINESS LAWS ANNOTATED (West
Group 1999).
60. Department of State Division of Corporations web site:
httpsJ/ccfssl.dos.state.fl.us/corpweb/efiling/onlmenu.html, or httpJ/www.dos.state.fl.us /doc
/feecorp.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2001).
61. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.1401-.14401 (2000).
62. Id. §§ 607.1402-.1403 (for corporations that have commenced business). Shareholders
may dissolve a corporation without action of the board of directors. Id. § 607.1402(5).
63. Curiously, a streamlined procedure for dissolving corporations that have not
commenced business requires the corporation to state that no debt remains unpaid. Id. §
607.1401(4). This requirement does not exist for corporations that have commenced business.
64. Id. § 607.1405. Before the current statute became effective in 1990, a corporation could
not voluntarily dissolve until liabilities had been discharged and assets had been distributed.
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dissolution does not transfer the corporation's property, relieve
directors or officers of their duties, or prevent proceedings against
the corporation.65 However, if the dissolved corporation notifies its
known claimants, the corporation in effect creates a three-year
statute of limitations within which claimants must file claims
against shareholders for amounts distributed to shareholders in the
liquidation.6" The statute is silent as to unknown claimants. 7
Second, the Department of State may dissolve a corporation for
failing to comply with requirements." As with voluntary
dissolution, a dissolved corporation continues to exist for the
purpose of winding up its affairs, liquidating assets and liabilities,
and notifying claimants.69 Third, a circuit court may dissolve a
corporation upon request by the state, shareholder, or creditor and
upon the showing of grounds required by statute.7 ° Under all three
dissolution methods, there is no requirement that a corporation
transfer a permit, notify the permitting agency of the corporation's
dissolution, or handle the obligations under the permit.
C. Business Entities
Corporations have been the focus of this article because the
corporate form is the most common business entity encountered by
the water management districts. It is the one type of business
entity that most people are familiar with and, with the assistance
of standardized forms available for no charge on the internet or for
sale at stationery stores, is therefore the simplest entity to form.
Developers, though, can find the corporate form too restrictive at
times as Florida law imposes a number of requirements on the
operation of a corporation.
For example, the initial directors are required to meet after
incorporation to appoint officers and adopt bylaws;7' the corporation
must maintain a registered agent at all times;"2 shares in the
corporation must be distributed and accounted for;73 and the
Now, however, a corporation can dissolve and then wind up its affairs. The filing of the
articles of dissolution can affect the running of the statute of limitations. COHN & AMES,
supra note 59, at 157.
65. FLA. STAT. § 607.1405(2) (2000).
66. Id. § 607.1406.
67. COHN & AMES, supra note 59, at 160.
68. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.1420-1421 (2000).
69. Id. §§ 607.1421(3).
70. Id. §§ 607.1430-1433.
71. Id.§ 607.0205.
72. Id. §§ 607.0403-0505.
73. Id. §§ 607.0601-0627.
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shareholders must hold an annual meeting.74  While these
requirements may not seem particularly onerous, other business
entity types offer greater flexibility to a developer seeking a short-
lived business entity that can easily be controlled and still offer a
protective shell to shield the developer from personal liability.
Florida law allows for the creation of two business entities, the
limited liability company and the limited partnership, that serve the
developer in these situations by allowing the developer to hide its
existence yet still grants the developer the power to control the new
entity. Obviously not all limited liability companies and limited
partnerships are formed with the purpose of hiding past mistakes,
but their means of management and the protection from liability
they offer make them suitable vehicles for developers seeking a
"fresh start" with the regulatory agencies.
1. Limited Liability Companies
Limited liability companies are creatures of statute and
controlled by the Florida Limited Liability Company Act under
chapter 608, Florida Statutes. Unlike Florida corporations that are
controlled by a board of directors who then select the officers to
handle the day-to-day operations of the company, limited liability
companies are controlled by either the member of the company or a
manager. In a member-managed company, the members of the
limited liability company, that is the persons or entities that
contributed the initial cash, property, or services to create the
company, manage the company in proportion to their percentage in
the profits of the company. 5 Or, the articles of incorporation for the
limited liability company may provide for a manager to run the
company.76Neither the members nor the manager of a limited liability
company may be held liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of the
limited liability company.7  This protection from liability also
extends to monetary damages to the limited liability company,
except in limited circumstances such as a violation of criminal law.78
A developer merely has to find or create another person or entity
to incorporate as a limited liability company. If the developer
contributes the majority of the initial cash or property to the
company, then he has the right to run a member-managed limited
74. Id. § 607.0701.
75. Id. § 608.422(2)(a).
76. Id. § 608.422(3).
77. Id. § 608.4227(1).
78. Id. § 608.4228(1). See The New Limited Liability Company in Florida, 73 FLA. B.J. 42
(1999), for a further discussion of Florida limited liability companies.
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liability company. Or, if the articles of incorporation call for a
manager-managed company, the developer can name himself as the
manager. In either case, the limited liability company is simply an
extension of the original developer.
Limited partnerships are also controlled by statute under the
Florida Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act found in chapter
620, Florida Statutes. Limited partnerships are usually thought of
as consisting of the general partner who runs the partnership while
the limited partners are restricted to providing funds for the
business and then sharing in the profits and losses. For assuming
the role of a "silent partner," the limited partner is not liable for the
obligations of the limited partnership unless he or she participates
in control of the business.79 "Control of the business," though, is
rather broad and a number of statutory exemptions are provided
which allow a limited partner to participate in the business. By
statute, the following activities are not considered as participating
in control of the business being a contractor for or an agent or
employee of the limited partnership; consulting with or advising a
general partner with respect to the business; acting as a surety,
guarantor, or endorser for the limited partnership. 0 Similar to the
limited liability company, a developer need only find another person
to act as general partner to create a limited partnership." The
developer assumes the role of a limited partner, contributes the
funds for the development project, and then "consults" or "advises"
the general partner as necessary to run the partnership.
In both situations, the developer has created a new business
entity that it can control and that will shield the developer from any
liability imposed on the business entity. More importantly, the new
business entity prevents the regulatory agencies from using the
developer's history of noncompliance in either the permit
application process or enforcement of its laws and rules.
D. Corporate Veil Piercing
As a general matter, limited liability will be preserved except
where the corporate principals have abused the corporate form to
the detriment of those dealing with the corporation. 2 Nevertheless,
because limited liability has led to abuses of the corporate form,83
79. FLA. STAT. § 620.129(1) (2000).
80. Id. § 620.129(2).
81. See Thomas 0. Wells, A Comparison Between Florida Limited Liability Companies and
Florida Limited Partnerships, 68 FLA. B.J. 58 (1994), for a further discussion of Florida
limited partnerships and a comparison with limited liability companies.
82. House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. Am. Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972).
83. See Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Robert Burnett, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Florida
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courts have responded by developing the doctrine of "piercing the
corporate veil" when a corporation is used in a manner not
contemplated by law.' In such cases, if a corporation is found liable
and is unable to satisfy the judgment, a claimant may attempt to
pierce the corporate veil to recover from the corporation's
shareholders or the parent or sister companies, which would
otherwise not be liable. 5 Corporations may be formed for the
purpose of limiting liability, and therefore the claimant has the
burden of overcoming the presumption that shareholders are
immune.' In essence, piercing the corporate veil is a way to enforce
a judgment against a corporation.87
Each state has developed case law for circumstances in which
the corporate veil may be pierced. In Florida, the standard is
"improper conduct," which puts Florida somewhere between the
states that require proof of fraud and states that allow piercing
without proof ofwrongdoing.88 However, the Florida Supreme Court
has not defined improper conduct, so litigants must examine various
cases to understand the type of conduct that warrants veil
piercing. 9
In Florida, every case allowing veil piercing involved a sham
corporation or using the corporate form to mislead or defraud
creditors.9" The case law indicates that where a shareholder (or a
parent or sister company) uses the corporation to mislead creditors
or to evade liability in a transaction that is personal (or for the
benefit of the parent or sister company), then the corporate form has
been abused and "improper conduct" might be established. 9' The
proof might include evidence that the corporation had no interest in
the matter (i.e., the transaction was unrelated to the corporation's
business) or that the corporate property was converted or depleted
for the benefit of the shareholder (or parent or sister company).92
The cases suggest that an agency may be able to pierce the
corporate veil in situations with facts similar to those presented
below the corporation's transaction was really for an individual's
personal benefit, evidenced by the conversion of corporate revenues
Defining Improper Conduct, 21 NoVA L. REV. 663, 665 (1997), for a thorough discussion of
corporate veil piercing in Florida. See also Renee A. Roche, Beyond the Corporate Veil The
Potential Liability of Officers and Agents, 66 FLA. B.J. 22 (1992).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 665-66.
86. COHN & AMES, supra note 59, at 8.
87. Cane & Burnett, supra note 83, at 666.
88. Id. at 664, 668.
89. Id. at 664.
90. COHN & AMES, supra note 59, at 9.
91. See Cane & Burnett, supra note 83, at 674.
92. See id.
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to personal assets and by the merging of corporate and personal
assets and liabilities; " the corporation's property was converted or
depleted for the personal benefit of shareholders, evidenced by
tracing the corporation's property to the shareholders;94 the
corporation is a sham created for the sole purpose of holding a lease,
evidenced by the fact that its officers and its sister company's
officers were the same, and the corporation never had a bank
account, never filed tax returns, had no assets, and conducted no
other business;95 the corporation was used to shield personal
property from creditors, evidenced by a history of transfers of
property;96 the corporation had no interest in the transaction, and
the corporate name was used as a convenience and to mislead or
defraud creditors.
97
Interestingly, the corporate veil was not pierced where the
purpose of incorporation was to prevent a party to a transaction
from knowing the identity of the other party.9 That ruling could be
relevant to situations where an individual would form a corporation
to apply for a permit for the purpose of hiding the individual's
identity from the agency. In addition, the corporate veil will
probably not be pierced just because a poorly managed company is
insolvent. 99
Procedurally, to reach the assets of an individual or a parent or
sister corporation, the agency must first obtain a judgment against
the corporation and then seek to satisfy the judgment by piercing
the corporate veil. Before the veil will be pierced, the agency must
show "improper conduct" as described above, as well as establish
that the conduct caused injury.' ° Practically speaking, this means
two rounds of litigation first to establish liability, then to satisfy the
judgment. Given an agency's limited resources and the uncertain
outcome of such litigation, an agency may decline to pursue this
avenue except in the most egregious cases.
93. See Futch v. Head, 511 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
94. See Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Indus., 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
95. See USP Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Discount Auto Parts, Inc., 570 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1990).
96. See Estudios Proyectos e Inversiones de Centro America, S.A. v. Swiss Bank Corp.,
S.A., 507 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
97. See Biscayne Realty & Ins. Co. v. Ostend Realty Co., 148 So. 560 (Fla. 1933).
98. See 111 Properties, Inc. v. Lassiter, 605 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
99. See Cane & Burnett, supra note 83, at 673 (undercapitalization is relevant only if the
corporation was undercapitalized for the purpose of misleading or defrauding creditors); see
also COHN & AMES, supra note 59, at 8.
100. See Cane & Burnett, supra note 83, at 673; see also Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes,
40 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984) (the leading Florida case on corporate veil piercing); Johnson
Enterprises of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 1998) (a case
involving a parent and subsidiary applying Florida law).
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E. Personal Liability
While piercing the corporate veil involves disregarding the
corporate form where there has been improper conduct on the part
of the corporate principal, personal liability may be directly imposed
on corporate principals without the need to pierce the corporate veil,
where such principals are found to have personally participated in
the corporate wrongdoing. ' In the environmental arena, there is
an increasing tendency for courts to assess liability against
corporate principals who are directly involved in a violation of an
environmental statute that involves tort-like standards such as
nuisance.0 2 The majority of cases where courts have imposed
personal liability for environmental wrongs have been federal cases
involving hazardous waste statutes. Although many of these federal
hazardous waste statutes are some of the most far-reaching statutes
in terms of liability, it has taken almost two decades for the federal
courts to resolve the issue of personal liability under these statutes.
The tension between corporation protection and environmental
protection is evident even in the most environmentally protective
statutes. Perhaps the most far-reaching environmental protection
statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),1O3 stretches concepts
of liability to their outer extreme. Through CERCLA, Congress
made clear its intent to impose strict liability, retroactive liability,
and joint and several liability. Yet even with the wide net of
101. The theory of personal liability of corporate officers evolved over the course of many
years starting in 1943. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). In
Dotterweich, the Court affirmed the conviction of a corporate officer under the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) for introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce.
Although the Court did not expressly articulate a theory of personal liability for corporate
officers, the Court found that the only way a corporation could act was through the actions
of its employees and that because the purpose of the FFDCA was to protect public health, as
a matter of public policy, the corporate officer should be held responsible. Almost thirty years
later, the U.S. Supreme Court in another FFDCA case found a corporate owner/director liable
for the corporation's violation of the Act, finding that a corporate agent, through whose act,
default, or omission the corporation committed the crime, was himself guilty of the individual
crime. See United States v. Park, 321 U.S. 658 (1975). This time, the Court clearly
articulated the principle that the necessary element for liability of the corporate agent is for
the agent to have had a "responsible relation to the situation." Id. at 669. Since Parks,
numerous federal and state courts have assessed personal liability agents and corporate
principals in a number of tort cases and under various public health, safety and welfare
statutes. At least two Florida courts have assessed personal liability against corporate
principals. See, e.g., Orlovsky v. Solid Surf. Inc., 405 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Adams
v. Brickell Townhouse, Inc., 388 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
102. See, e,g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (corporate officer
is liable if he personally participates in the wrongful, injury-producing act).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (2000).
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liability that CERCLA casts, Congress did not make clear whether
corporate principals or parent corporations of responsible
corporations should be brought within the purview of CERCLA. For
years the federal circuit courts struggled with the issue of whether,
and under what legal theory, parent corporations could be liable for
their subsidiaries' violations of CERCLA. It was not until 1998 that
the U.S. Supreme Court squarely addressed this issue in the case of
United States v. Bestfoods.'" In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court
addressed the application of CERCLA's "owner/operator" provision
to parent corporations. The issue was whether a parent corporation
that actively participated in and exercised control over the
operations of a subsidiary may be held liable as an "operator" under
CERCLA. The Court ruled that there are two theories under which
a parent corporation could be found liable for the CERLCA
violations of its subsidiaries. Not surprisingly, the first theory
articulated by the Court is that of corporate veil-piercing. More
significant however, is the second theory of liability set forth in this
case which does not involve veil piercing. Under this theory, the
Court focused on the fact that under CERLCA section 107(a)(2),
"operators" of hazardous waste facilities may be liable as well as the
"owners" of such facilities. Thus, the Court reasoned that a parent
corporation itself could be directly liable as an "operator" of a facility
owned by its subsidiary if the parent itself, or in connection with its
subsidiary, acted as the operator of the facility by actively
participating in and exercising control over the operations of the
facility. °5 Thus, it is now clear, that at least for environmental
statutes that assess liability against "operators" as well as "owners,"
parent corporations may be directly liable.0 6 Additionally, a
number of lower courts have imposed personal liability against
corporate officers under CERCLA under the provisions of the act
104. 524 U.S. 51 (1998), vacating and remaining sub noma. United States v. Cordova Chem.
Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997).
105. See id. at 64. The Bestfoods Court further clarified that to be personally liable, an
operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to the environmental
pollution or make decisions about compliance with environmental regulations. Id. at 66-67.
106. For a thorough discussion of the Bestfoods decision and the evolution of the law leading
up to it see Lucia Ann Silecchia, Pinning the Blame & Piercing the Veil in the Mists of
Metaphor The Supreme Court's New Standards for the CERCLA Liability of Parent Companies
and a Proposal for Legislative Change, 67 FORDHAm L. REV. 115 (1998), and Robert J. Sutphin,
Jr., Environmental Law-Owners or Operators Two District Paths to Parent Corporation
Liability under CERCLA - United States v. Bestfoods, 30 N.M.L. REV. 109 (2000). See also
Joel R. Burcat & Craig P. Wilson, Post-Dissolution Liability of Corporations and Their
Shareholders under CERCLA, 50 BUS. LAW. 1273 (1995); Charles E. Dadswell, Jr., The
Corporate Entity Is There Life After CERCLA?, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 463 (1990); George W. Dent,
Jr., Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 151 (1991); Larry S.
Kane, How Can We Stop Corporate Environmental Pollution? Corporate Officer Liability, 26
NEW ENG. L. REV. 293 (1991).
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that assess liability on "persons" who violate the act. Because
CERCLA defines "persons" to include individuals as well as
corporations, courts have found officers who personally participated
in violations to be personally liable as "persons" under the act. 107
Although the vast majority of the cases addressing direct
liability of parent corporation as "operators" or personal liability of
corporate officers as "persons" in the environmental arena are
federal cases, parallels exist with Florida law and there is no reason
why Florida courts could not take a similar approach in assessing
liability for violations of Florida environmental laws. Notably, with
regard to water management district enforcement, chapter 373
attaches liability to "persons."108 "Persons" is defined broadly to
include "any and all persons, natural or artificial .... ""o9 Thus,
Florida courts could impose personal liability against corporate
principals who personally participate in violations of chapter 373.
Moreover, as with the federal environmental laws that contain tort-
like nuisance standards, chapter 373 also embodies public nuisance
tort concepts. Specifically in section 373.433, the legislature
expressly declared that any work that violates Water Management
District rules is a public nuisance. Thus, there are no grounds for
distinguishing water management violations from federal hazardous
waste violations for the purposes of imposing personal liability. In
fact, in at least one case, a Florida court has imposed liability
against a corporate officer for an environmental violation under a
theory of personal liability. In State, Department of Environmental
Protection v. Harbor Utilities Company, Inc. , 1 the court found that
corporate officers, directors and managers may be subject to
personal liability under Florida's Air and Water Pollution Control
Act.' 1 Although the case did not involve a violation of chapter 373,
it did involve a violation of environmental statutory provisions that
assess liability against "persons" who commit violations, much in
107. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 763 F.2d 1886 (2d Cir. 1985) (corporate
officer was liable because he knew that the hazardous waste was on the site and he directed
and controlled all corporate decisions); United States v. Carolawn Co., 698 F. Supp. 616
(D.S.C. 1987) (three corporate officers liable because they were personally involved in day-to-
day site operation); United States v. N.E.P.A.C.C.O., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(corporate vice president held personally liable because he had direct supervision over and
actual knowledge of the waste disposal site).
108. FLA. STAT. § 373.119 (2000). Authorizing an administrative complaint to be served
upon an alleged "violator," and provides that such order shall become final unless the "person"
named therein requests an administrative hearing. Id. § 373.430. Providing that it shall be
a violation of this part, and it shall be prohibited for any "person" to carry out any of the
enumerated acts.
109. Id. § 373.019(5).
110. 684 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
111. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.031(5), .141, .161 (2000).
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the same way as sections 373.119 and 373.430, Florida Statutes. In
Harbor Utilities, the court was persuaded by the fact that the
corporate officer/director had repeatedly represented that he held
managerial authority to take "whatever action necessary" to bring
the facility into compliance, yet failed to do so. The court found that
the statutes at issue expressly assess liability against "persons,"
which includes individuals, and that there is no language in the
statute to limit civil liability to permittees and facility owners
only.112 Likewise, there is nothing in the relevant provisions of Part
IV of chapter 373 that would limit liability. Thus, personal liability
may be a viable option for water management districts to pursue in
bringing enforcement actions for violations of water management
district rules or permits.
VI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS THAT LOOK BEHIND THE CORPORATE
SHELL
Some current laws do exist that allow a permitting agency to
take into consideration the people behind the corporate form in the
permitting process. For example, the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection may refuse to issue a waste management
facility permit to an applicant based on that applicant's past
conduct."' If the applicant has repeatedly violated the laws and
rules governing the operation of waste management facilities and
is deemed "irresponsible" by DEP, the applicant may find its permit
application denied."4 What gives this section its "teeth" above and
beyond the general rule allowing DEP to deny a permit based on
past conduct," 5 is the DEP's authority to look behind the applicant's
corporate form in its permitting process for waste management
facilities. DEP has defined the term "applicant" in this section to
include:
112. Harbor Utilities, 684 So. 2d at 303.
113. FLA. STAT. § 403.707(8) (2000).
114. See id.; FLA. ADMIN. CODE. R. 67-701.320(3)(2000). "Irresponsible" means:
[Ain applicant owned or operated a solid waste management
facility in this state, including transportation equipment or
mobile processing equipment used by or on behalf of the
applicant, which was subject to a state or federal notice of
violation, judicial action, or criminal prosecution for activities
that constitute violations under Chapter 403, Fla. Stat., or the
rules promulgated thereunder, and could have prevented the
violation through reasonable compliance with Department
rules.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE. R. 62-701.320(3)(b) (2000).
115. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. R. 62-4.070(5) (2000).
[Vol. 17:1118
THE CORPORATE SHELL GAME
[T]he owner or operator of the facility, or if the owner
or operator is a business entity, a parent or
subsidiary corporation, a partner, a corporate officer
or director, or a stockholder holding more than 50
percent of the stock of the corporation." 6
By broadly defining applicant to allow DEP to look behind the
corporate form, DEP can learn the identity of the actual operators
of the proposed waste management facility will be. If a business
entity or person has violated the waste management laws in the
past, they cannot hide that past conduct under the shell of a new
entity. The Florida Secretary of State cannot be used by a past
violator to expunge a history of noncompliance through a simple
change of names. The past conduct of that entity or person, no
matter under what name or form that conduct occurred, can be used
by DEP to determine if the current permit applicant has provided
reasonable assurances that it will comply with the agency's laws
and rules.
The laws of Florida are not unique in considering an applicant's
past violations during the permitting process or in factoring a
party's history of noncompliance in the penalty amount for
violations of environmental laws. Common to a number of federal
environmental permitting programs is the requirement that past
violations be considered by the trier of fact in determining the
amount of the civil penalty. These types of laws are found in the
Clean Water Act," 7 the Section 404 wetlands permitting program
administered by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers," 8 the Clean Air
Act,"9 the Toxic Substances Control Act, 2 ° and the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act.'
2
'
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act deserves
special attention because it not only contains statutory language
concerning past violations for determining penalties, but also
addresses the issues raised in this article the use of various
business entities to mask the actual controlling parties to obtain a
permit unsoiled by past violations. The application for a surface
coal mining and reclamation permit requires, in part, the following
information:
116. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. R. 67-701.320(3)(a) (2000).
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2000).
118. Id. § 1344(s)(4).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2000).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(B) (2000).
121. 30 U.S.C. § 1268(a) (2000).
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[I]f the applicant is a partnership, corporation,
association, or other business entity, the following
where applicable the name and addresses of every
officer, partner, director, or person performing a
function similar to a director, of the applicant,
together with the name and address of every person
owning, of record 10 per centum or more of any class
of voting stock of the applicant and a list of all names
under which the applicant, partner, or principal
shareholder previously operated a surface mining
operation within the United States within a five-year
period preceding the date of submission of the
application.122
[A] statement of whether the applicant, any
subsidiary, affiliate, or persons controlled by or under
a common control with the applicant, has ever held a
Federal or State mining permit which in the five-year
period prior to the date of submission of the
application has been suspended or revoked has had
a mining bond or similar security deposited in lieu of
bond forfeited and, if so, a brief explanation of the
facts involved.12
Usually, a permit application is signed only by the president or
managing partner of the entity, and the agency has no means of
learning the names of the other individuals involved in the business
entity. By requiring the information stated above in a permit
application, the issuing agency quickly learns who the real people
are behind the entity applying for the permit. It is the people who
run the business that concern the permitting agencies.
Corporations and limited liability companies do not make decisions,
the people who occupy the seats on the board of directors and act as
officers make the decisions. They are the ones who decide if the
business entity will comply with the permit condition and they are
the ones who decide when and how to violate the permit.
While some of the information may be available from the entity's
state division of corporations or other state agency, the respective
state will have on file only that information that was submitted in
the articles of incorporation or other documents forming the
122. 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b)(4) (2000).
123. Id. § 1257(b)(5).
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business entity. 124 Most states require a new business entity to file
the names of the initial officers but there is no requirement that the
state be kept appraised of stock ownership.
The requirement in the surface coal mining and reclamation
permit that all persons owning 10 per centum or more of any class
of voting stock be listed is important because there is no
requirement that either an officer or director of a corporation or
limited liability company own stock in that company. Compensation
for both types of positions can be in cash or services. 2 ' And, while
the board of directors may set policy and the officers control the day-
to-day operations, the stockholders can use their ownership interest
to control the business. The stockholders vote for the board of
directors and can obviously back those individuals who will carry
out the wishes of the major stockholders. 26 The "10 per centum of
stock" requirement prevents an individual from setting up straw
men as officers and directors of business and continuing to control
the business through his or her majority ownership of stock. The
owner of the business cannot hide behind those officers and
directors and claim ignorance of the activities of the business.
The purpose of requiring this information in the surface coal
mining and reclamation application is to alert the permitting agency
of those individuals who were responsible for or involved in permit
violations in the past. This information can then be used by the
agency in determining whether the permit applicant has provided
sufficient reasonable assurances that the applicant will comply with
the conditions of the permit. If some of the individuals listed on the
permit application have a history of permit violations, then the
agency can use that history of noncompliance as grounds for
requiring additional assurances before issuing the permit.
Although there are a number of environmental laws that
authorize environmental agencies to look behind the corporate shell,
Florida law currently does not contain any such provision that
would authorize a water management district to do so in enforcing
the provisions of part IV of chapter 373.
VII. CONSIDERATIONS FOR CHANGE
If the water management districts desire to enhance their ability
to enforce the environmental laws that they administer, there are
a number of changes in their practices, regulations, and statutes
124. See FLA. STAT. § 607.0202 (2000). The articles of incorporation for corporation must
contain the name and address of the individuals who are to serve as the initial directors.
125. Id. § 607.08101.
126. Id. § 607.0803(3) (2000).
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that could be considered. First, the water management districts
could focus their enforcement efforts on aggressively pursuing
corporate principals of developer corporations that lack assets to
bring projects into compliance or pay the necessary penalties by
seeking to either pierce the corporate veil or pursue personal
liability against corporate principals who personally participate in
the environmental wrongdoings. Both of these options are available
without any changes to existing law. However, as described above,
the agencies would bear a heavy burden and the processes for
obtaining such judgments can be cumbersome.
Another option that the water management districts may want
to consider is pursuing statutory changes that would allow the
consideration of corporate principals or related corporate entities in
both determining whether reasonable assurances have been
provided to issue a permit and in assessing penalties for violations
that occur. Such statutory changes could involve changes to the
definition of permit "applicant" to include not only the business
entity that is applying for the permit itself, but also any corporate
principal or related business entity. Similarly, statutory changes
could be made that would make it clear that in either assessing a
penalty informally through a voluntary consent order or in seeking
to have a circuit court assess a penalty, the water management
districts would have the authority to take into account the past
water management violations of not only the business entity that is
the permittee or the violator, but also of any principal of the
corporation or related business entity. An approach similar to this
was pursued by the DEP during the 2001 legislative session. The
DEP staff drafted legislation to address the concepts discussed
above. 127 The bill, entitled "The Florida Performance Based
Environmental Permitting Act," 28 would have, among other things,
required a permit applicant to provide information not only on its
past activities but also on the past activities of its related entities.
The bill also would have authorized FDEP to evaluate the
compliance history of the corporation and its related entities based
on a point system in determining whether to issue a permit.
Finally, the bill would provide incentives for permit applicants and
other related entities with good compliance history. The draft
legislation contained the following definitions:
127. FDEP staff worked at models from other states at Florida's solid waste permitting
laws, at tax and bankruptcy laws and at various debarment programs in developing the draft
legislation. Telephone interview with Jack Chisholm, FDEP attorney (Mar. 14, 2001).
128. FLA. HB 1627 (2001); FLA. SB 2112 (2001), available at httpJ/www.oeg.state.fl.us (last
visited Apr. 25, 2001).
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"Applicant" means the owner, operator, or president
of the proposed activity requiring a permit as well as
the permittee if different from the owner, operator, or
president.
"Related entities" means (1) an individual who is or
was an officer, manager or partner of applicant
during the past five years if the individual has or had
operational control of the applicant or the applicant's
environmental affairs, (2) a business entity where
that individual worked, (3) a stock holder who owns
more than 50 percent of the applicant, and (4) a
parent corporation.
Although the bill did not pass and died in committee without much
serious consideration, the concepts of considering related entities in
determining whether to issue a permit are important concepts that
should be considered in future legislative changes. Notably, the
definition of "applicant" proposed in the bill includes the term
"operator." The inclusion of this term would make clear that
corporate principals or parent corporations that play an active role
in the operations of the corporation, may have personal liability for
environmental violations under the Supreme Court's Bestfoods
approach.
If the water management districts pursue an approach similar
to that set forth in the bill, a component could be a statutory change
modeled on existing statutes such as the federal Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act, described above, which requires that
business entity applicants provide information on officers, partners,
directors, and shareholders and a statement of whether any related
entity has held a permit which has been revoked or suspended.
A third consideration for the water management districts would
involve statutory changes of a different nature. Water management
districts should consider whether to pursue statutory changes that
would require corporate permit holders to notify the district within
a specified period of time prior to their dissolution. This would
allow the water management district to have notice of the
impending dissolution in time to pursue any enforcement actions
necessary to bring the permitted project into compliance prior to the
corporate dissolution. This option has several drawbacks however.
First, with regard to involuntary administrative dissolution, it is
unlikely that the permit holder would be able to provide notice prior
to such dissolution. More importantly, however, notice of
dissolution does not address the true issue which is the problem of
the corporation whether dissolved or still in existence, failing to
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have sufficient assets itself to either carry out the activities
necessary to bring the project into compliance or to pay an
appropriate penalty.
To address these concerns, perhaps a better option for the water
management districts to consider is a requirement that all permit
applicants provide financial assurances in the form of a performance
bond or letter of credit, up front before obtaining a permit, in an
amount sufficient to cover the costs of properly constructing the
surface water management system as well as the costs of properly
maintaining such system and the costs of addressing problems with
the system that may occur in the future. Although this approach
would place a burden on the permit applicants who do not have a
history of noncompliance and who do follow the rules, it would
ensure that sufficient financial resources would be available to
ensure that projects were properly built and maintained. If the
water management districts do not find it appropriate to place the
financial assurance burden on all permit applicants, another option
would be for the water management districts to limit the
requirement for financial assurance to permit applicants that either
themselves have a history of noncompliance with water
management district rules or whose corporate principals and/or
related business entities have a history of noncompliance with water
management district rules. This could be accomplished without a
statutory change. Existing statute sections 373.413 and 373.416
already authorize the water management districts to impose such
reasonable conditions as are necessary to assure that the
construction alteration, operation, or maintenance of a system will
not be harmful to the water resources of the district. These
provisions provide sufficient authority for the water management
districts to adopt regulations that impose conditions requiring
financial assurance on permit applicants whose corporate principals
or related business entities have shown a history of compliance
problems such that financial assurances are necessary to ensure
that the permitted project will not cause harm to the water
resources of the district.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To resolve the tension between environmental protection and
corporate protection, a delicate balance must be struck to ensure
that goals of corporate protection are not exalted above the
important public policy goals of environmental protection. A
number of options exist for water management districts to enhance
their enforcement of environmental laws despite the tendency of the
developers to form new business entities for each project or phase
124 [Vol. 17:1
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of a project. Some of these options can be pursued through existing
laws such as under the theory of corporate veil piercing or personal
liability. Other options would have to be accomplished through
either statutory changes to authorize water management districts
to consider the past violations of corporate principals and related
business entities in determining whether to issue a permit and in
determining the amount of a penalty to be assessed. Other options
would not require statutory changes but, instead, could be
accomplished through rule changes such as an option that would
require permit applicants with a history of noncompliance or whose
corporate principals or related business entities have a history of
noncompliance to provide financial assurance that a project will be
properly carried out and maintained prior to obtaining a permit.

